

Wyższa Szkoła

Policji

19. TAPT

THE MYTH ABOUT DATA DELETION

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allegro



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NAND FLASH STORAGE




- USB pendrives
- Smartphones
- Tablets
- Memory cards (SD, microSD, CF, etc)
- Solid State Drives
- Digital voice recorders
- GPS devices
- Other devices




NAND & eMMC CHIPS

- TSOP48
- LGA52
- BGA169 eMMC
- BGA100
- BGA132
- BGA152
- BGA137
- BGA154
- BGA221





NAND MEMORY ENDURANCE




SLC NAND – up to 100'000 MLC NAND – up to 10'000 TLC NAND – up to 1500



DELETE OPERATION ON FILE SYSTEM LAYER

OLD INVISIBLE VERSION OF DATA ON PHYSICAL NAND LAYER



Normally when the file is deleted, there's only metadata modified to make it invisible. But in fact, there still old version of this metadata is stored in another NAND block.



PHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF NAND MEMORY


Block	
Page Page Page	

Block is a minimal unit of ERASE operation

Page is a minimal unit of READ/WRITE operation




DATA MODIFICATION IN NAND. IN THEORY





DATA MODIFICATION IN NAND. ON PRACTISE





CASE STUDY

Scenario: The ex-employee of company is accused in stealing corporate's client database

Evidence collected: Pendrive where he has probably copied stolen files


Goals: Find any traces or files related to database "ELPIDA"

Notes: No database files were found during classic forensic analysis. Data is probably deleted and overwritten.






CHIP-OFF NAND IMAGE EXTRACTION PROCESS





When physical image is extracted, it has to be transformed to logical image







Here we see	data blocks	which sl	hape logical	image with	file system

🚢 ₹ Dump viewer	Visual Nand Reconst	ructor – 🗗 🗙
Case Navigator Dump viewer Hex viewer		
Hex Bitmap Structure Records Save Save view view view all selected		
🛱 Markers table 0 🗙 👼 Workspace	-	<u>≝7 Par 0 ×</u>
Block markers	Page markers	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
Use Bank LBN Header Test2 Address LB RB	LPN Address	0004C50000 FA BE 00 7C BF 00 7A B9 00 01 FC 0E 1F 0E 07 F3 5. ĭ.z⊮
✓ 00 1000 FF FFFF 0004C50000 □	▲ FF 0004C50000	0004C50010 Å5 EÅ 16 7Å 00 00 BB BE 7B 33 C9 80 3F 80 75 06 Ĩĸ.z≫s{3ЙЂ?Бu. 0004C50020 FE C5 8B F3 EB 07 80 3F 00 75 02 FE C1 83 C3 10 ∞E<∀π.Ђ?.u.∞EfT.
Ø 00 1001 50 FFFF 00152C4000 □	FF 0004C50210	0004C50030 81 FB FE 7B 72 E5 83 F9 04 74 0B 81 F9 03 01 74 「山町 ref皿.t.f皿t
✓ 00 1002 50 FFFF 00148F8000 □ ✓ 00 1003 50 FFFF 000858C000 □	FF 0004C50420	0004C50040 0Å BB Å5 7Å EB 2C BB 87 7Å EB 27 8B 4C 02 8B 14 .»Ízπ,»≠zπ' <l.<. 0004C50050 B8 01 02 BB 00 7C CD 13 73 05 BB BC 7Å EB 13 2E ĕ».∣H.s.»jzπ</l.<.
Image: 00 1003 50 FFFF 000858C000 Image: 00 Image: 00 1004 50 FFFF 0007590000 Image: 00	FF 0004C50630 FF 0004C50840	0004C50060 A1 FE 7D 3D 55 AA 74 05 BB BC 7A EB 05 EA 00 7C У́р}=U€t.»jzл.к.
	FF 0004C50840 FF 0004C50A50	0004C50070 00 00 2E 8Å 07 3C 00 74 0C 53 BB 07 00 B4 0E CDБ.<.t.S»г.Н 0004C50080 10 5B 43 EB ED EB FE 4E 6F 20 62 6F 6F 74 61 62 .(СлндрУю bootab
✓ 00 1005 50 FFFF 001D850000 ✓ 00 1006 50 FFFF 001C2A8000	FF 0004C50C60	0004C50090 6C 65 20 70 61 72 74 69 74 6F 6E 20 69 6E 20 74 le partiton in t
✓ 00 1006 30 FFFF 001228000 ✓ 00 1007 50 FFFF 0013A04000	FF 0004C50E80	0004C500A0 61 62 6C 65 00 49 6E 76 61 6C 69 64 20 50 61 72 able.Invalid Par 0004C500B0 74 69 74 6F 6E 20 74 61 62 6C 65 00 49 6E 76 61 titon table.Inva
♥ 00 1007 50 FFFF 0015304000	FF 0004C51080	0004C500C0 6C 69 64 20 6F 72 20 64 61 6D 61 67 65 64 20 42 lid or damaged B
♥ 00 1009 50 FFFF 0017C88000 .	FF 0004C51290	0004C50000 6F 6F 74 61 62 6C 65 20 70 61 72 74 69 74 69 6F octable partitio
✓ 00 100A 50 FFFF 001C4B8000 □	FF 0004C514A0	0004C500F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
✓ 00 100B 50 FFFF 000BD3C000 □	FF 0004C516B0	0004C50100 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
☑ 00 100C FF FFFF 0004CD4000 □	FF 0004C518C0	0004C50120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
☑ 00 100D FF FFFF 000ECAC000 □	FF 0004C51AD0	0004C50130 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
☑ 00 100E FF FFFF 001C434000 □	FF 0004C51CE0	0004C50150 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
✔ 00 100F FF FFFF 001D958000 □	FF 0004C51EF0	0004C50160 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
✔ 00 1010 FF FFFF 0002520000 □	FF 0004C52100	0004C50180 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
✓ 00 1011 FF FFFF 001C224000 □	FF 0004C52310	0004C50190 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
☑ 00 1012 FF FFFF 00058B0000 □ □	FF 0004C52520	0004C501B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BF 63 39 C6 00 00 01ïc9X
☑ 00 1013 FF FFFF 000A818000 □	FF 0004C52730	0004C501C0 01 00 06 0F E0 5F 20 00 00 00 E0 BF 1E 00 00 00aaĭ 0004C501D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
☑ 00 1014 FF FFFF 0000CE4000 □	FF 0004C52940	0004C501E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
✔ 00 1015 50 FFFF 00158F4000 □ ✔ 00 1016 50 FFFF 001647C000 □	FF 0004C52B50	0004C501F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0
✔ 00 1016 50 FFFF 0016A7C000 ✔ 00 1017 50 FFFF 001DE80000	FF 0004C52D60 FF 0004C52F70	
♥ 00 1017 50 FFFF 001DE80000	FF 0004C52F70 FF 0004C53180	
♥ 00 1018 50 FFFF 001740000	FF 0004C53390	
♥ 00 1019 11 111 0013550000	FF 0004C535A0	
✓ 00 101B 50 FFFF 0012D20000 □	FF 0004C537B0	
✓ 00 101C 50 FFFF 0003C54000 □	FF 0004C539C0	
☑ 00 101D 50 FFFF 0006300000 □ □	FF 0004C53BD0	
☑ 00 101E 50 FFFF 00099A8000 □ □	FF 0004C53DE0	
☑ 00 101F 50 FFFF 000EA9C000 □	FF 0004C53FF0	
☑ 00 1020 50 FFFF 0006618000 □	FF 0004C54200	
☑ 00 1021 50 FFFF 001E00C000 .	FF 0004C54410	
☑ 00 1022 50 FFFF 00170AC000 🗌	FF 0004C54620	
☑ 00 1023 50 FFFF 00141C0000 □	FF 0004C54830	
00 1024 50 FFFF 001EBE8000 🗌	FF 0004C54A40	
	▼ FF 0004C54C50	
Position 0x0 from 0x800	Position 0x0 from 0x3FF	Address: 80019456 Selected:
Event loa explorer		
Last active selection: address 80019456 selected		

There are some other blocks beyond the range of data blocks, they are system and invisible outside interface. In one of those blocks we can find a fragments of file system's metadata, in particular - FAT folder. This FAT folder contains file record of "ELPIDA.MDB" and "ELPIDA .LDB" files. It proves existence of the stolen files on suspect's device.

🔹 🔻 Dump viewer		Visual Nand Reconstructor 🛛 🚽 🔿
Case Navigator Dump viewer Hex viewer Stru	ucture viewer	
Hex Bitmap Structure Records Save Save view view view view all selected		
躍 Markers table 0 🗙 🧶 Workspace		∭ ^r Pairo ×
Block markers	Page markers	
Use Bank LBN Header Test2 Address LB RB	LPN Address	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 0002310840 2E 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 00 1E 2C 98
✓ 01 13A9 50 FFFF 003EC70000 □	▲ 4E 0002310000 ▲	0002310850 9A 3A 9A 3A 00 00 2D 98 9A 3A 27 08 00 00 00 m:m: m:
✓ 01 13AA FF FFFF 0028488000	FF 0002310210	0002310660 28 28 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 00 1E 2C 98
✔ 01 13AB 50 FFFF 0028A34000	FF 0002310420	0002310880 42 A1 03 A9 03 20 00 2E 00 6D 00 0F 00 18 64 00 B ^y . [®] ^m d.
✓ 01 13AC FF FFFF 002EB24000 □	FF 0002310630	0002310890 62 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF 00 00 FF FF
✓ 01 13AD FF FFFF 002349C000 □	D0 0002310840	
✓ 01 13AE FF FFFF 002C160000 □	D1 0002310A50	0002310800 9A 3A A3 3C 00 00 1A 72 A3 3C 00 00 28 2C 98 ELEPTA-10B
✓ 01 13AF 50 FFFF 003DA64000 □	D2 0002310C60	00023108E0 42 20 00 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00 0F 00 27 2E 00 B .t.e.s.t'
 ✓ 01 13B0 FF FFFF 002D684000 □ ✓ 01 13B1 FF FFFF 003F21C000 □ 	D3 0002310E70	00023108F0 6D 00 64 00 62 00 00 00 [FF FF 00 00 [FF FF PF FF FF m.d.b.n.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.sn.s
✓ 01 13B1 FF FFFF 003F21C000 ✓ 01 13B2 FF FFFF 003D9E0000	D4 0002311080 D5 0002311290	0002310910 95 03 Å3 03 20 00 95 03 Å5 03 00 00 Å1 03 Å9 03 · J ·.TÝ.⊕. 0002310920 84 92 88 89 84 92 7E 31 4D 44 42 20 00 07 30 98 "'€‰.' 1\DB0 File attributes (1)
✓ 01 13B2 FF FFFF 0034878000	D6 00023114A0	D002310930 9A 3A 29 3C 00 00 AF 56 29 3C F7 0E 00 00 7D 04 B:) < TV) < W }
✓ 01 13B3 FF FFFF 0024414000	D7 00023116B0	002310940 42 22 00 6D 00 64 00 62 00 00 00 0F 00 88 FF FF B
✓ 01 13B5 FF FFFF 0034B0C000 □	D0 00023118C0	0002310960 01 95 03 Å4 03 99 03 9Å 03 95 03 0F 00 88 Å4 03 .•.⊭. [™] . љ.•€¤. → reserved space (10) Extension 3
✓ 01 13B6 FF FFFF 0026724000 □	D1 0002311AD0	0002310970 95 03 Å3 03 20 00 95 03 Å5 03 00 00 Å1 03 Å9 03 · J. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
✓ 01 13B7 FF FFFF 003D3B0000 □	D2 0002311CE0	0002310990 04 38 83 3C 00 00 [71 [53 83 3C] EB 20 00 B0 D7 00 ", f4 <qs<sup>4<π .BU. File Timestamp 2</qs<sup>
✓ 01 13B8 FF FFFF 0031A94000	D3 0002311EF0	00023109A0 04 B1 03 C0 03 BF 03 B2 00 02 F 00 F 00 F 00 F 00 F 30 00 00 A±A, 1, 1, 1, 2, ., K0.
✔ 01 13B9 FF FFFF 003BD00000	D4 0002312100	00023109C0 B0 BF BE 82 32 30 31 30 58 4C 53 20 00 9C 68 75 5UT, 2010XLS .bhu 22 23 2 LBN 2
✓ 01 13BA FF FFFF 003D6C8000	D5 0002312310	00023109D0 37 3Å 98 3C 00 00 [68 Å0 [42 3C [33 02 100 Å2 [63 00] 7; < k B·3 %C.] 00023109D0 41 Å1 03 Å9 03 20 00 2E [00 6C 00 [0F [00 56 64 00] B ³ , @ Kd.] → File Datestamp [2] test1 2
✓ 01 13BB 50 FFFF 003D95C000	D6 0002312520	00023109F0 62 00 00 0F FF
00 1000 52 FFFF 0001BD8000	D7 0002312730	0002310A00 01 45 00 6C 00 70 00 69 00 64 00 0F 00 58 61 00 .E.1.p.i.dXa. 24.25 2 Filename (E5 - deleted; 00 - unallocated) 1
00 1041 52 FFFF 0002310000	F0 0002312940	0002310A20 45 4C 50 49 44 41 7E 31 4C 44 42 20 00 49 FC 71 ELPIDA~1LDB .Ibq 👄 First file duster num (2) Header 1
00 1065 52 FFFF 0017760000	F1 0002312B50	0002310A30 A3 3C A3 3C 00 00 FD 71 FA3 5C 32 02 100 00 00 00 J J-J-C
00 1077 52 FFFF 0017448000 0 00 13D9 50 FFFF 0015B04000 0	F2 0002312D60	
00 13D9 50 FFFF 0015B04000 0 00 31D9 50 FFFF 00049BC000 0	F3 0002312F70 F4 0002313180	👄 File size (4)
00 5109 30 FFFF 0000496C000	F5 0002313390	28 - 31 4
00 FFFF 50 FFFF 0002CDC000	F6 00023135A0	
00 FFFF FF FFFF 000C57C000	F7 00023137B0	
00 FFFF FF FFFF 0011568000	F8 00023139C0	
00 FFFF FF FFFF 0013B90000	F9 0002313BD0	
00 FFFF 4D FFFF 0015E1C000	FA 0002313DE0	
00 FFFF FF FFFF 002094C000	FB 0002313FF0	
01 13B0 52 FFFF 0027E58000	FC 0002314200	
01 FFFF 4D FFFF 0021630000	FD 0002314410	
01 FFFF 4D FFFF 002EF44000	FE 0002314620	
01 FFFF FF FFFF 0030CA8000	FF 0002314830	
01 FFFF FF FFFF 0033F30000	D0 0002314A40	
	• D1 0002314C50 •	
Position 0x7B1 from 0x800	Position 0x4 from 0x3FF	Address: 36767808 Selected: 0
Event log explorer		
Last active selection: address 36767808 selected 0		



In another copy of the page we can even see the history of file creation and modification. The blocks that contain pages with different versions of data are called "LOG block", because they keep LOGs of data modification. In this page we can see that time stamp of "ELPIDA.MDB" was changed.

Image: Discrete intermediate Image: Discrete intermedint Image: Discrete intermediate	l ▼ Dump viewer Case Navigator Dump viewer Hex viewer	Structure viewer	Visual Nand Reconstructor	
0 0 1386 Fr Fr 00 0386 Fr 050 087 0387 050 087 0387 050 087 0387 050 087 0387 050 087 050 087 0387 050	Case Navigator Dump viewer Hex viewer Bitmap view Structure view Provide Save save save save save save save save s	LPN Address 4E 0002310000 ● FF 0002310210 ● FF 0002310420 ● FF 0002310840 ● D1 0002310840 ● D2 0002310840 ● D3 0002310870 ● D4 0002311080 ● D5 0002311420 ● D6 0002311460 ● D0 0002311680 ●	Pair 0 X 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0Å 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 0023118C0 9A 3A 3A 3A 00 00 120 98 9A 3A 127 08 00 00 00 00 00 2E 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 00 1E 2C 98 00023118C0 9A 3A 3A 3A 00 00 120 98 9A 3A 127 08 00 00 00 00 00 2E 2E 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 120 00 1E 2C 98 00023118C0 9A 3A 3A 3A 00 00 120 98 9A 3A 100 00 100 10 1E 2C 98 00023118C0 9A 3A 3A 3A 00 00 120 98 9A 3A 100 00 100 00 00 00 00 2E 2E 20 00 20 20 00 2E 00 00 100 100 18 64 000 9A 3A 3A 3A 00 00 120 98 9A 3A 100 00 100 18 64 00 000231190 06 C0 07 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF 100 00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 18 61 00 0002311920 00 32 00 30 00 130 00 130 00 120 00 18 61 00 18 61 00 18 61 00 002311920 00 32 00 30 00 130 00 120 00 19 00 18 61 00 18 61 00 18 61 00 18 100 18 61 00 18 100	 Plane ► Bank ► Block ► Page ► Data area ► Entry ► Filename (E5 - deleted; 00 - unallocated) (1) Filename (7) Filename (7) Filename (7) Data area S12 Spare area File attributes (1) File attributes (1) File size File size File size File size File size File size
Position 0x751 from 0x800 Position 0xC from 0x3FF Address: 36772032 Selected: 0	Image: second secon	D2 0002311EC0 D3 0002311E70 D4 0002311210 D6 0002312310 D6 0002312300 D7 0002312340 F1 0002312500 F2 0002312540 F1 0002312540 F3 0002312760 F4 0002313180 F5 0002313760 F8 0002313760 F8 0002313760 F4 000231360 F4 0002314620 F5 0002314620 F6 0002314620 F7 0002314620 F6 0002314620	0002311A00 14 3B 83 00 00 71 53 B 83 03 20 00 F0 00 EA 30 00 0002311A0 14 B1 03 C0 03 BF 03 B3 03 32 00 F0 00 EA 30 00 0002311A0 15 00 02 E0 01 78 00 6C 00 100 00 73 00 0002311A0 17 3A 93 C0 00 16B A0 42 32 00 00 F0 00 EA 30 00 0002311A0 17 3A 93 C0 00 00 EB 70 00 CC 00 00 F0 70 58 64 00 17 (7, <, k 84., ýc. 0002311A0 16 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 FF FF	III - 21 10 File Timestamp (2) File Timestamp 2 Image: Second



There are several copies of page with file system's metadata. In this version we can see that timestamp of "ELPIDA.LDB" was changed.

Dump viewer		Visual Nand Reconstructor		- 0
Navigator Dump viewer Hex viewer Bitmap view Structure view Records view Save all Save save all Save save save Kers table 0 Vorkspace Fill Save all Save selected 1 13A9 50 FFF 003E70000 - 1 13A9 50 FFF 0028489000 - 1 13A5 50 FFF 0028489000 - 1 13A5 50 FFFF 0028489000 - 1 13A0 FF FFFF 0028489000 - 1 13A0 FF FFFF 0028490000 - 1 13A0 FF FFFF 002849000 - 1 13B0 FF FFFF 003050000 - 1 13B1 FF FFFF 00347000 - 1 13B2 FF FFFF 003480000 - 1 13B5 FF FFFF 00	Page markers PR LPN Address - 4E 6002310200 - FF 0002310210 - FF 0002310210 - FF 0002310420 - FF 0002310420 - D0 0002310420 - D1 0002310420 - D2 0002310420 - D3 0002310420 - D4 0002310420 - D5 0002310420 - D6 0002310420 - D6 0002311420 - D1 0002311400 - D2 0002311400 - D2 0002311400 - D2 0002311400 - D2 0002311450 -	Image: Strain	 ▶ Plane ▶ Bank ▶ Block ▶ Page ▶ Data area ▶ Entry ▶ Plane Bank Block Page Bank Block Plane Bank Block Page Data area Entry Data area Entry Spare area Entry Spare area Entry Spare area Ecc File attributes (1) 1 - 1 1 1 File attributes (1) File Timestamp (2) File Timestamp (2) Plie Timestamp (2) File Timestamp (2) File	1107296256 as Plane 553648128 as Plane 553648128 as Place 528 as Page 512 as Block 528 as Page 512 as Data 32 16 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1
00 FFFF 4D FFFF 0000528000 . 00 FFFF 50 FFFF 0002CDC000 . 00 FFFF FFF 0002CDC000 . 00 FFFF FFF 001558000 . 00 FFFF FF FFF 001558000 . 00 FFFF FFF 001551000 . . 00 FFFF FFF 002758000 . . 01 FFFF 4D FFFF 002758000 . 01 FFFF 4D FFFF 002758000 . 01 FFFF 4D FFFF 002758000 . 01 FFFF FFF 003264000 . . 01 FFFF FFF 003573000 . . 01 FFFF FFF 003573000 . . 01 FFFF FFF 003513000 . .	F5 0002313390 F6 0002313760 F7 0002313760 F8 0002313760 F9 0002313760 F4 0002313760 F8 0002313760 F9 0002313760 F8 0002313760 F8 0002313760 F0 0002314200 F7 0002314620 F7 0002314620 F7 0002314620 F8 000002314620 F9 00002314620	Address: 36704704 Selected: 0		



In the latest versions of the page we can see that eventually files related to ELPIDA database were deleted. File recovery is not possible in this case, but the trace, the fact that this file was existing on device proves that files were actually stolen.

🚜 -	Dump viewer		Visual Nand Reconstructor		- 0 ×
Case Navigator	Dump viewer Hex viewer	Structure viewer			۵
Hex view Bitmap view Structure view Structure	view all selected	÷	巡/ Pair 0 ×		
Not set	Block markers	Page markers			L Entry A
Use Bank LBN Header V 01 13A9 50 V 01 13A4 FF V 01 13A0 FF V 01 13A0 FF V 01 13A0 FF V 01 13A0 FF V 01 13A5 FF V 01 13B0 FF V 01 13B1 FF V 01 13B4 FF V 01 13B4 FF V 01 13B5 FF V 01 13B5 FF V 01 13B6 FF V 01 13B5 FF V 01 13B5 FF V 01 13B5 FF V 01 13B5 S2 00 1001 52 00 1007		Page markers LPN Address F4 000231380 F5 000231350 F7 000231350 F7 000231350 F8 000231350 F7 000231350 F8 000231350 F9 000231350 F0 000231350 F0 000231350 F0 000231350 F0 000231350 F0 000231410 FE 0002314410 FE 0002314410 FE 000231440 D1 000231440 D1 000231450 D2 000231520 D3 000231520 D5 000231540 D6 0002315540 D1 000231560 D2 0002315610 D5 0002316510 D5 0002316510 D6 0002316510 D6 0002316510 D6 0002316510 <tr< th=""><th>00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 06 05 06 <td< th=""><th> Plane > Bank > Block > Page > Data area Filename (E5 - deleted; 00 - unallocated) (1) Filename (7) File attributes (1) File attributes (1) File Timestamp (2) Z - 23 File Datestamp (2) Z - 25 Fils the Cluster num (2) Z - 27 File Size (4) Z - 31 4 </th><th>Fintry ▶ Plane 1107296256 as Plane Bank 553648128 Block 540672 as Block Page 528 as Page Data area 512 0 data was Entry 32 Spare area 16 ECC 10 reserved space 10 File name 7 File Jatzetamp 2 Ettni 3 File Datestamp 2 Ets11 2 Ets11 2 File attributes 1 File attributes 1 File attributes 1 Etade 1</th></td<></th></tr<>	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 09 04 05 06 07 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 06 05 06 <td< th=""><th> Plane > Bank > Block > Page > Data area Filename (E5 - deleted; 00 - unallocated) (1) Filename (7) File attributes (1) File attributes (1) File Timestamp (2) Z - 23 File Datestamp (2) Z - 25 Fils the Cluster num (2) Z - 27 File Size (4) Z - 31 4 </th><th>Fintry ▶ Plane 1107296256 as Plane Bank 553648128 Block 540672 as Block Page 528 as Page Data area 512 0 data was Entry 32 Spare area 16 ECC 10 reserved space 10 File name 7 File Jatzetamp 2 Ettni 3 File Datestamp 2 Ets11 2 Ets11 2 File attributes 1 File attributes 1 File attributes 1 Etade 1</th></td<>	 Plane > Bank > Block > Page > Data area Filename (E5 - deleted; 00 - unallocated) (1) Filename (7) File attributes (1) File attributes (1) File Timestamp (2) Z - 23 File Datestamp (2) Z - 25 Fils the Cluster num (2) Z - 27 File Size (4) Z - 31 4 	Fintry ▶ Plane 1107296256 as Plane Bank 553648128 Block 540672 as Block Page 528 as Page Data area 512 0 data was Entry 32 Spare area 16 ECC 10 reserved space 10 File name 7 File Jatzetamp 2 Ettni 3 File Datestamp 2 Ets11 2 Ets11 2 File attributes 1 File attributes 1 File attributes 1 Etade 1
01 FFFF FF	FFFF 0030CA8000	D7 00023179B0			
_	FFFF 0033F30000	FF 0002317BC0 FF 0002317DD0			
· · · · · · · · ·					
Position 0x7B1 from 0x800		Position 0x34 from 0x3FF	Address: 36793152 Selected: 0		
Event log explorer Last active selection: addre	ss 36793152 selected 0				



CONCLUSION

It is known fact that NAND Flash storage devices do not erase data when it's deleted, during a period of time (until garbage collection algorithm eventually does it).

As we have just proven, chip-off data extraction and analysis is the only way to find 100% of user's data or data traces on flash device

This method is applicable for working and heavily damaged (non-working) flash devices that utilize NAND memory.

