


Chip-off Evidence Extraction from IoT Devices Mykhailo Rybkin - Rusolut

Forensics Europe Expo 2022 8-9 June 2022, London




IoT Network





Chip-off data recovery method

Memory chip unsoldering Chip identification Chip reading and adapter selection and file structure re-build Logical image analysis and file extraction





Chip-off data recovery method advantages

- No risk of overwriting data and losing device logs
- Access to data ensured by password
- Access to all data stored on the device
- Ability to recover data from damaged devices
- Access to deleted via standard interface data



Embedded flash file systems of devices IoT YAFFS, UBI FS, NAND FS, RAW

Functions

- NAND memory blocks usage optimization (Wear levelling)
- Translation of a physical image into a logical form
- Refresh operations for data allocated in blocks

Properties

- No standardized metadata
- Multiple versions of filesystems
- Ability to recover old/deleted data



Case studies





Mikrotik RB433GL Wi-Fi Router



Google Home Speaker





Case 1 - CALIX 844E-1






CALIX 844E-1


Network software

	Status Quick Start Wireless	Help Logout About
Calix Home Gateway User Name: Password: Cogin	Quick Start Connect To Internet Configure Wireless Network Set Time Zone WPA/WPA2 Password: 1234567890 Apply Wireless Protected Setup Wireless Protected Setup (WPS) provides an easy and secure way to establi wireless device by sharing the wireless assword between the two devices.	



PCB of CALIX 844E-1









NAND reading process

尾 🛨																				Vis	ual Nand F	2
Case	w	orkspace		Plugins																		
Delete	Сору	Open images Eleme	₩B 5	nsert area ikip area ixtract are tions	Re	move ba	ad 📔	4														
🕀 Worl	cspace ×																					l
>			÷						+						+				+			1
×		Read	ier) /	Phy im		> *									+				+	÷	+	1
R		0		Phy im		+		÷			+		+	+	+		+			+		1
PI			. 1	Chip1	_0_0 [,	>			15%		Reading Chip:	Chip0	from re	ader			÷		÷	÷	٠	
BCR				Chip2		> °					Port: 0 Crysta	l: 0	_				+		+	÷		1
BCH		+	•	Phy im	iage	•		÷				Cancel			.:	+	+	+	+	+	+	1
		+		Chip3	_0_0 [;	>			+		+		+	÷	+		+		+			1
X		+	÷	÷					+						+		+		+	÷		
P		+	÷	÷		+			+						+		+	+	+	÷		1
U		+	÷	÷	÷	÷	+		+		+	+	÷		+	+	+	÷	+	+	+	
		+	•						+						+		+		+			1
		+	•	+		+			+		+				+		+	+	+	+		
\odot	+		٠	•		÷			+	÷					٠		÷		٠	÷	+	



Physical image from NAND chip

La III = Demp viewer Case Navigator Hex viewer Bitmap viewer	Visual Nand Reconstructor	— d	J X
Hex Bitmap view View View Control View View View View View View View View			
🖉 Offsets 2 🗙 🚳 Workspace			Ŧ
		<mark>U</mark> BI ≇	
	0000000010 00		A .{ ⁻ Àö
······································			



UBI File System

Name	Size	Files	Last Modified 💌	Allocated	Туре	Folders
V 3 MB_G:\UBIFS\CALIX\ on_INV_SSD1	3 MB	53	<u>19/05/2022 17:36:35</u>	3 MB	Folder	25
✓ 3 MB Files-volume-1	3 MB	27	19/ <mark>05/2022 17:36:35</mark>	3 MB	Folder	19
V 📙 3 KB udihopd	3 KB	2	19/05/2022 17:36:35	4 KB	Folder	0
🗃 459 Bytes udhcpd.conf	459 Bytes	1	05/08/2021 01:31:34	0 Bytes	CONF File	0
😰 2 KB udhcpd.leases	2 KB	1	05/08/2021 01:31:34	4 KB	LEASES File	0
> 2 КВ рое	2 KB	1	19/05/2022 17:36:35	4 KB	File	0
∽ <mark>_</mark> 3 MB log	3 MB	5	19/05/2022 17:36:35	3 MB	Folder	0
512 KB messages.0	512 KB	1	23/07/2021 23:17:16	516 KB	0 File	0
📑 512 KB messages.1	512 KB	1	12/07/2021 09:47:50	516 KB	1 File	0
512 KB messages.2	512 KB	1	12/07/2021 01:45:48	516 KB	2 File	0
512 KB messages.3	512 KB	1	11/07/2021 17:28:54	516 KB	3 File	0
💥 512 KB messages.4	512 KB	1	07/07/2021 06:39:30	516 KB	4 File	0
> 🔥 33 KB delta_1	33 KB	5	19/05/2022 17:36:35	36 KB	Folder	3
> 33 KB delta_0	33 KB	5	19/05/2022 17:36:35	36 KB	Folder	3
> 0 Bytes arc	0 Bytes	0	19/05/2022 17:36:35	0 Bytes	Folder	6
🗸 📄 🧧 68 KB [9 Files]	68 KB	9	05/08/2021 01:31:33	80 KB		0
1 KB log_message	1 KB	1	05/08/2021 01:31:33	4 KB	File	0
3 KB smact_data.json	3 KB	1	05/08/2021 01:31:33	4 KB	JSON File	0
8 KB scratchpad	8 KB	1	05/08/2021 01:31:31	8 KB	File	0
32 Bytes running_uptime	32 Bytes	1	05/08/2021 01:31:09	0 Bytes	File	0
📗 183 Bytes upgrade_log.dat	183 Bytes	1	05/05/2021 08:04:39	0 Bytes	DAT File	0
826 Bytes var_log_128k_mapagent_saved	826 Bytes	1	05/05/2021 08:03:21	4 KB	File	0
3 KB wlanmgr_log_messages_saved	3 KB	1	05/05/2021 08:03:21	4 KB	File	0
46 KB var_log_messages_reset_saved	46 KB	1	05/05/2021 08:03:20	48 KB	File	0



DHCP Leases

		Device name
udhcpd.leases	MAC Addresses Leased IP Addresses	
0000 C8 52 61 0058 18 9C 27 0080 00 E0 4C 0108 58 E6 BA 0160 BC 77 37 0188 18 9C 27 0210 18 9C 27 02168 18 9C 27 02168 18 9C 27 0218 14 FE 85 0370 14 FE 85 0376 14 FE 85 04220 86 CA A3 0478 48 D2 24 0400 7C 65 67 0528 A0 C9 40	Mac Addresses Junca California Junca Californi Junca Californi	A [*] ú NODE_WIFI_18:9c:27 A [*] ú A [*] ú OU! A [*] ú NODE_WIFI_18:9c:27 A [*] ú A [*] ú OU! A [*] ú A [*] ú
	option subnet 255.255.255.0 option router 192.168.250.1 option dns 192.168.250.1 option dns 192.168.250.1 option domain Home interface brqt start 169.254.1.2	
	end 169.254.1.2 option lease 86400 min_lease 30 option subnet 255.255.255.0 option router 169.254.1.1 option dns 169.254.1.1 option dns 169.254.1.1 option dmain Home	•
	Ln 1, Col 1 100% Unix (LF)	UTF-8



Case 1 - Summary

IP address rent-time is 24 hours, so all devices mentioned in the UDHCPD.leases file were connected to the network within 24 hours, starting from file creation date

Name	Size	Files	Last Modified 🔻	Allocated	Туре	Folders
V A B G:\UBIFS\CALIX\ on [NV_SSD] (Scan of 19/05/2022)	3 MB	53	19/05/2022 17:36:35	3 MB	Folder	25
V 3 MB Files-volume-1	3 MB	27	19/05/2022 17:36:35	3 MB	Folder	10
∽ 3 KB udhcpd	3 KB	2	19/05/2022 17:36:35	4 KB	Folder	0
📑 459 Bytes udhcpd.conf	459 Bytes	1	05/08/2021 01:31:34	0 Dytes	CONF File	0
😕 2 KB udhcpd.leases	2 KB	1	05/08/2021 01:31:34	4 KB	LEASES File	0
> 2 КВ рое	2 KB	1	19/05/2022 17:36:35	4 KB	File	0

05/08/2021 01:31:34 File creation date

udhcpd.	
0000	
0058	
0058 0080	18 9C 27 00 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
0108	58 E5 BA 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0160	BC 77 37 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0188	18 9C 27 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0210	18 9C 27 00 <td< th=""></td<>
0268	18 9C 27 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
02C0	18 9C 27 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0318	A4 11 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0370	14 FE 85 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
03C8	1 C BF C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0420	86 CA A3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0478	48 D2 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
04D0	7C 05 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0528	80 86 D9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0580	AG C9 AG 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
05D8	6E 7F 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0630	
0688	A4 C3 F6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
06E0	F8 0F F9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0738	F8 0F F9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0790 07E8	68 37 D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0760	46 37 DA 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06 06
0898	16 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 15 15 15 16 16 16 16 17 5 15 15 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
0850	5 17 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0948	94 6C 59 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0940	
0000	
	File Edit Format View Help
	decline_file /var/udhcpd.decline
	auto time 900
	interface br0
	start 192.168.250.10 Lease time - 24 Hours
	Lease time - 24 mours
	option lease 86400




Case 2 - Google Home Speaker




- Fully voice controlled device
- Standard smart speaker functions replicate functions of Google assistant
- Smart home central node
- Compatible with other Chromecast devices

NAND chip extraction and preparations for read-out



NAND chip




Non-standard package microsoldering

Unsoldering



NAND reading process






VNR reader with NAND Chip inserted

Software side of reading process



Visual data analysis in VNR



Page structure analysis



First look

	Meta data offset			Sequence number Object Id offset	offset	2048 🗢 2052 🗢	Byte count offset Block status offset	2060 🗢		4	2					
Bloc filte				Chunk Id offset		2056 🗘	Data status offset	\$	Read OBB	Sync						
Titte	i sollei			enancia onsec	OOB positio		bata statas onset	•	Obb	uui	np					
	· · · ·				OOB position	5115										
💫 Offsets	1 × 🧶 Workspace															
Use Chu	nk Type Object Type	Object Id	Chunk Id	Sequence number	Byte count	Parent Object ID	Name	Permissions	UID	GID	atime	mtime	ctime	File size H/S link value		Address
\checkmark	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000102	0x000101	0x0000101C	0x0930	0x101	log	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x5	0x5	0x5	0x930		0x0006F50C8
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000103	0x000101	0x0000101C	0x0930	0x101	last_log	0x81A0	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x5	0x5	0x5	0x930		0x0006F5150
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000104	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x002B											0x0010E6F70
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000104	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x002B	0x1	hw.txt	0x810000	0x0	0x0 (0x1A003800	0x1A003858	0x4358			0x0010E6CC8
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000104	0x000101	0x0000101C	0xA995	0x101	last_logcat	0x81A0	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x5	0x5	0x5	0xA995		0x0006F51D8
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000105		0x0000100C	0x052E	0x1	client.crt	0x8124	0x18EA5	0x1388 (0x580140C9	0x580140C9	0x43	0x52E		0x0010E6910
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000105	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x052E											0x0010E6FF8
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000107	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x055F	0x1	client.crt.gen2	0x8124	0x18EA5	0x1388 (0x580140C9	0x580140C9	0x43	0x55F		0x0010E6998
~	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000107	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x055F											0x0010E7108
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x00010A	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x0019											0x0010E7190
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00010A	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x0019	0x1	mac_addr	0x8124	0x18EA5	0x1388 (0x580140C9	9 0x580140C9	0x43	0x19		0x0010E6BB8
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x00010C	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x0177											0x0010E7218
\checkmark	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00010C	0x000001	0x0000100C	0x0177	0x1	checksum.sha1	0x8124	0x18EA5	0x1388 (0x580140CA	A 0x580140CA	0x43	0x177		0x0010E6888
✓	0x80 Soft link header (0x20)	0x00011C	0x00010D	0x0000101A	0x0000	0x10D	kb.bin	0xA1FF	0x0	0x0	0x2	0x2	0x2	0x0 /factory/kb.bin???????????????????????????????????	77777777777777	0x0006F1900
~	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x00011F	0x000001	0x0000101A	0x0035											0x0006F1988
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00011F	0x00010C	0x0000101A	0x0035	0x10C	wpa_supplicant.conf	0x8180	0x3F0	0x3F0	0x3	0x3	0x3	0x35		0x0006F1658
√	0x80 Soft link header (0x20)	0x000120	0x000106	0x0000101A	0x0000	0x106	localtime	0xA1FF	0x0	0x0	0x3	0x3	0x3	0x0 /usr/share/zoneinfo/America/Los_/	Angeles???????????????????????????????????	? 0x0006F1A10
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00012A	0x000101	0x00001017	0x0000	0x101	recovery.log	0x8180	0x0	0x0	0x5	0x5	0x5	0x0		0x0006EADB0
~	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00012C	0x000202	0x0000101A	0x0002	0x202	bootid	0x81A4	0x0	0x0	0x8	0x7	0x7	0x2		0x0006F1C30
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x00012C	0x000001	0x0000101A	0x0002											0x0006F1BA8
~	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00012D	0x000202	0x0000101A	0x0200	0x202	random_seed	0x8180	0x0	0x0	0x8	0x7	0x7	0x200		0x0006F1D40
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00012E	0x000109	0x0000101B	0x0000	0x109	lockfile	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0xA	0x9	0x13	0x0		0x0006F2FD8
~	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000134	0x000111	0x00001017	0x0131	0x111	bt_config.conf	0x81B0	0x3EA	0xBC0	0xD	0xD	0xD	0x131		0x0006EB0E0
~	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000134	0x000001	0x00001017	0x0131											0x0006EB058
~	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00013B	0x00013A	0x0000101A	0x008E	0x13A	LOG.old	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x11	0x12	0x11	0x8E		0x0006F1FE8
~	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x00013B	0x000001	0x00001017	0x008E											0x0006EB498
~	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00013C	0x00013A	0x00001017	0x0000	0x13A	LOCK	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x11	0x11	0x11	0x0		0x0006EB300
~	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000142	0x000001	0x0000101B	0x04BC											0x0006F2B98
~	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000142	0x00013F	0x0000101B	0x04BC	0x13F	watchdog.conf	0x8180	0x0	0x0	0x11	0x13	0x10	0x4BC		0x0006F2C20
~	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000155	0x000001	0x0000101B	0x0014		-									0x0006F3528
✓	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000155		0x0000101A	0x0014	0x10E	metrics_client_id	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x14	0x14	0x2	0x14		0x0006F0FF8
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x00018F		0x0000101B	0x0085				-							0x0006F4958
 ✓ 	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x00018F		0x0000101A	0x0085	0x10E	.chirp.conf	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x1E	0x1E	0x2	0x85		0x0006F1548
✓	0x00 Data (0x00)	0x000190		0x0000101C	0x04B0											0x0006F4F30
 ✓ 	0x80 File header (0x10)	0x000190		0x0000101C	0x24B0	0x14A	cloud_settings.prefs	0x8180	0x3E8	0x3E8	0x21	0x21	0x21	0x24B0		0x0006F4FB8

YAFFS parser look in VNR software



Interesting files

Files extracted from researched device #1

- bootid
- bt_config.conf
- build_info.txt
- checksum.sha1
- client.crt
- client.crt.gen2
- cloud_settings.prefs
- eureka.conf

- hw.txt
- LOG
- LOG.old
- mac_addr
- metrics_client_id
- random_seed
- serial.txt
- watchdog.conf
 etc.

Files extracted from researched device #2

- eureka.conf
- watchdog.conf
- hostapd_entropy.bin
- bootid
- pkcs11.txt
- client.crt.gen2
- key4.db

- cert9.db
- metrics_client_id
- ampservice.pid
- test-bin.stderr
- test-bin.stdout
- settings

etc.

SSL certificates



client.crt

client.crt.gen2

	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 ^A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F	00	010E71080 21	D 2D 2D	2D 2	D 42	45 47	49 4E	20 43	45 5	2 54 49	BEGIN CERTI
0010E6FF80	2D 2D 2D 2D 2D 2D 42 45 47 49 4E 20 43 45 52 54 49		010E71090 4	6 49 43	41 5	4 45	2D 2D	2D 2D	2D 0A	4D 4	9 49 44	FICATEMIID
0010E6FF90	46 49 43 41 54 45 2D 2D 2D 2D 2D 0A 4D 49 49 44	FICATEMIID 00	010E710A0 7	9 7A 43	43 4	1 72	4F 67	41 77	49 42	41 6	7 49 45	yzCCAr0gAwIBAgIE
0010E6FFA0 0010E6FFB0	70 6Å 43 43 41 6F 36 67 41 77 49 42 41 67 49 45 57 41 45 6Å 58 44 41 4E 42 67 6B 71 68 6B 69 47	pjCCAo6gAwIBAgIE WAEjXDANBgkghkiG 00	010E710B0 5'	7 41 45	6A 5	8 6A	41 4E	42 67	6B 71	68 6	B 69 47	WAEjXjANBgkghkiG
0010E6FFC0	39 77 30 42 41 51 55 46 41 44 42 39 4D 51 73 77	"									4 45 4C	9w0BAQUFADCBiDEL
0010E6FFD0	43 51 59 44 56 51 51 47 45 77 4A 56 0A 55 7A 45	CQYD ^V QQGEwJ ^V .UzE								-	6 56 4D	MAkGA1UEBhMC VVM
0010E6FFE0	54 4D 42 45 47 41 31 55 45 43 41 77 4B 51 32 46 73 61 57 5 ^A 76 63 6D 35 70 59 54 45 57 4D 42 51	THREGAIDECHWKQZF									3 6B 4E	xEzARBgNVBAgMCkN
0010E6FFF0 0010E70000	47 41 31 55 45 42 77 77 4E 54 57 39 31 62 6E 52	banbro opribn bg									6 6A 41	hbGlmb3JuaWExFjA
0010E70010	68 61 57 34 67 56 6D 6C 6C 64 7A 45 54 0A 4D 42	hoWAgVmlldgET MP									4 57 35	UBgNVBAcMDU1vdW5
0010E70020	45 47 41 31 55 45 43 67 77 4B 52 32 39 76 5A 32	EGAIUECGWARZ9VZZ										-
0010E70030	78 6C 49 45 6C 75 59 7A 45 53 4D 42 41 47 41 31		010E71110 30	0 59 57	6C 7	5 4 9	46 5A	70 5A	58 63	78 0	A 45 7A	0YWluIFZpZXcx.Ez
0010E70040	55 45 43 77 77 4A 52 32 39 76 5A 32 78 6C 49 46	UECwwJR29vZ2x1IF 00	010E71120 4:	1 52 42	67 4	E 56	42 41	6F 4D	43 6E	64 7	6 62 32	ARBgNVBAoMCkdvb2
0010E70050	52 57 4D 52 67 77 46 67 59 44 56 51 51 44 0A 44	RWMRgwFgYDVQQD.D	010E71130 64	4 73 5A	53 4	2 4A	62 6D	4D 78	44 54	41 4	C 42 67	dsZSBJbmMxDTALBg
0010E70060	41 39 46 64 58 4A 6C 61 32 45 67 52 32 56 75 4D	Agraxulazegkzvum										
0010E70070	53 42 4A 51 30 45 77 48 68 63 4E 4D 54 59 78 4D										8 4B 44	NVBAsMBENhc3QxKD
0010E70080	44 45 30 4D 54 67 79 4E 6A 4D 32 57 68 63 4E 4D	DE0 ^M TgyNj ^M 2WhcN ^M 00	010E71150 4:	1 6D 42	67 4	E 56	42 41	4D 4D	48 30	4E 6	F 0A 63	AmBgNVBAMMH0No.c

The SSL certificate allows you to decrypt all the traffic of the Smart speaker.

This is where Forensics meets Intelligence... Imagine scenario where you already had traffic collected...



Geo location and client ID

settings

metrics_client_id

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Network config

mac_addr

bt_config.conf

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46 34 46 35 44 38 42 46 30 39 41 36 0A 46 34 46 F4F5D8BF09A6.		65 61 74 65 64 20 3D 20 31 39 36 39 2D 31 32 2D eated = 1969-12
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35 44 38 42 46 30 39 41 37 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5D8BF09A7		61 70 74 65 72 5F 0A 41 64 64 72 65 73 73 20 3D apterAddress
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	:0	61 37 0A 4C 45 5F 4C 4F 43 41 4C 5F 4B 45 59 5F a7.LE_LOCAL_KEY
	'0	49 52 4B 20 3D 20 65 36 61 33 36 33 33 36 30 62 IR ^K = e6a363360
		35 66 62 37 35 36 65 36 61 63 37 31 64 37 39 32 5fb756e6ac71d79
	.0	30 63 39 62 64 33 0A 4C 45 5F 4C 4F 43 41 4C 5F 0c9bd3.LE_LOCAL
	:0	4B 45 59 5F 49 52 20 3D 20 33 33 33 31 33 35 33 KEY_IR = 333135
	10	64 32 64 30 64 34 64 63 64 61 38 61 38 61 38 61 d2d0d4dcda8a8a8
	10	38 61 38 61 38 61 39 61 61 0 ^A 4C 45 5F 4C 4F 43 8a8a8a9aa.LE_LC
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	10	31 61 63 66 32 65 30 36 31 63 33 33 31 65 36 61 1acf2e061c331e6
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


The "first look" into devices shows the "user footprints" are there. Connecting this information with other parts of puzzle extracted from phone or other evidence may help to piece case together

This research is still ongoing, we are feeding several donor devices with lots of test data in order to pull out more information out of speakers and understand the whole scale of what is stored there.



Case 3 - Mikrotik RB433GL





YAFFS2 File system

	Case Navigator Hex viewer Bitmap viewer									۵
	Hex Bitmap Structure Records Save Save Extract selected	from begin end (back) current current (back)	135168 🔷 🖏 🗭 🚯 (0 / User size 🔷 🖏 🗭	/ 1023) Go to	Use cycle address	0	vafs	🛱 Find next	0 of 512 bytes block	
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VNR - YAFFS2 parser

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🔍 Phy ima	age Chip0_0_0 🗙 🧐 Worksp	oace	F IIE	meru	Juuru	VE	rsion m	SIDIY					-	📓 Phy image Ch	1ip0_0_0 ×			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
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V	0xC0 File header (0x10)	0x0001FD 0			0x0000 0x10		Oleszna_ap3_ap4.log.t					x5A021400	0x0	0000A60000 0000A60010	35 31 3A 32	2 39 20 77 69	76 2F 30 34 20 31 35 72 65 6C 65 73 73 2C	69 51:29 wireless,i
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	0xC0 File header (0x10)				0x0000 0x10		Oleszna_ap3_ap4.log.t		0x81A4 0x0 0			x5A25CF06 x5A29C386	0x0 0x0	0000A60080 0000A60090	6F 20 30 30	0 3A 41 41 3A	41 42 3A 30 30 3A 31 7A 2D 61 70 33 3A 20	46 o 00:AA:AB:00:1F
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	0xC0 File header (0x10)	0x0001FD (0x0001FD	_		_	0x0000	0x107	Oleszna_ap3_ap4	-			0x81A4	0x0 0x0	0x58201F/E	0x5A0E1406	32 3A 30 30 20 77 69 62 75 67 20 6F 6C 65	72 /04 15:52:00 wir
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Object content

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I	0xC0 File heade 0xC0 File heade		x0001FD 0x00010 x0001FD 0x00010		0x0000 0x0000	0x107 0x107	Oleszna_ap3_ap4.log.txt Oleszna_ap3_ap4.log.txt	0x81A4 0x81A4					0000A60050 78 74 65 6E 0000A60060 73 73 20 0A	73 69 76 65 20 64 61 74 6E 6E 76 2E 30 34 20 31	4 61 20 6C 6F	xtensive data lo
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V				18:21:95:84:2										7	A 2D 61 70 33 A 65 64 2C 20	:25:A7@olesz-ap3 : disconnected,
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Case 3 - Summary

Obtained access to the full system logs history from the period between 07/11/2018 - 26/06/2018

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Use Chunk Type Object Type Object Id Chunk Id Sequence number Byte count Parent Object ID Name Permissions UID G ✓ 0x00 Data (0x00) 0x0001FD 0x000016 0x000050AA2 0x0800 0x00000000000000000000000000000000000	SID atime mtime ctime 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F 000368A180 23 20 6A 75 6E 2F 32 30 31 38 20 20 35 jun/26/2018 5 : 0:15 by Router 000368A180 000368A180 24 20 34 21 20 73 6F 66 74 77 61 05 6.42.# softwa 000368A180 12 20 20 20 20 73 6F 66 74 77 61 05 6.42.# softwa 00366A180 12 20 20 20 23 20 73 6F 66 74 77 61 05 6.42.# softwa 05 05
<pre>nov/04 16:39:43 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: F4:42:8F:97:BE:73 attempts to associate nov/04 16:39:43 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: F4:42:8F:97:BE:73 not in local ACL, by default accept nov/04 16:39:43 wireless, info F4:42:8F:97:BE:73@olesz-ap3: connected nov/04 16:40:48 wireless, info F4:42:8F:97:BE:73@olesz-ap3: disconnected, extensive data loss nov/04 16:54:16 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 88:83:22:39:A8:BE attempts to associate nov/04 16:54:16 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 88:83:22:39:A8:BE not in local ACL, by default accept nov/04 16:54:16 wireless, info 88:83:22:39:A8:BE@olesz-ap3: connected nov/04 16:54:47 wireless, info 88:83:22:39:A8:BE@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received deauth: sending station leaving (3) nov/04 16:54:48 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 88:83:22:39:A8:BE not in local ACL, by default accept nov/04 16:54:48 wireless, info 88:83:22:39:A8:BE@olesz-ap3: connected nov/04 16:54:48 wireless, info 88:83:22:39:A8:BE@olesz-ap3: disconnected, extensive data loss nov/04 16:55:15 wireless, info 88:83:22:39:A8:BE@olesz-ap3: disconnected nov/04 16:55:15 wireless, info 88:83:22:39:A8:BE@olesz-ap3: disconnected nov/04 16:58:45 wireless, info 18:21:95:84:25:A7 attempts to associate nov/04 16:58:45 wireless, info 18:21:95:84:25:A7@olesz-ap3: connected nov/04 16:59:16 wireless, info 18:21:95:84:25:A7@olesz-ap3: connected nov/04 16:59:16 wireless, info 18:21:95:84:25:A7@olesz-ap3: connected nov/04 16:59:25 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 18:21:95:84:25:A7 attempts to associate nov/04 16:59:25 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 18:21:95:84:25:A7 attempts to associate nov/04 16:59:25 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 18:21:95:84:25:A7 not in local ACL, by default accept nov/04 16:59:25 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 18:21:95:84:25:A7 not in local ACL, by default accept nov/04 16:59:25 wireless, info 18:21:95:84:25:A7@olesz-ap3: c</pre>	<pre>*Untitled -Notepad ** × File fail: Format View Help # jun/26/2018 5: 0:15 by RouterOS 6.42 # software id = JZZZ-2GID * 0:00:34 wireless, info 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:00:55 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: connected, signal strength -83 00:00:55 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:00:55 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:01:16 wireless, jinfo 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:01:16 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:01:16 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:01:16 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:01:25 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:01:25 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:04:13 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:04:13 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:04:13 wireless, debug olesz-ap3: 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disassoc: sending station leaving (3) 00:04:13 wireless, info 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: connected, signal strength -84 00:04:13 wireless, info 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: connected, signal strength -83 00:04:13 wireless, info 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: connected, signal strength -83 00:04:13 wireless, info 14:5F:94:1F:37:43@olesz-ap3: disconnected, received disass</pre>
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